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1. INTRODUCTION
Learning and reading from professor Palánkai always has been a stable base to
understand the European integration procedures. The more precise and deeper
knowledge acquired by a young researcher from Palánkai [2003] and Palánkai
[2004], the more confidence arose about his own ability to understand the process-
es of the monetary integration and the optimum currency area model by Mundell
[1961], Kenen [1969] and McKinnon [1963]. Although it got clear, also, from
Palánkai [2005] and Palánkai et al. [2011] that the EMU is not an optimum currency
area in the euro-12 or euro-17 form, the young researcher was convinced that the
euro zone is “too big to fail”. Notwithstanding, Palánkai [2000], among others,
already recognized the structural problems of euro zone in its early years. But the
volume of euro zone crisis found unprepared not only many researchers but the
political leaders of the zone, too. Many theories and models remained set aside
before the Greek default seems to be necessary to be implemented in the main-
stream of integration economics. In the following, such a model will be interpreted.
The U.S. financial crisis shocked the EU in several ways. Among them, the pro-
longed euro zone debt crisis seems to be the biggest challenge of the Community.
The period of 2010–2012 proved, that the periphery of euro zone has had complex
structural problem. In first view, many of these countries in the euro zone face to
an endless debt unsustainability problem originated in two parallel procedure, the
remaining annual budget deficit and the declining production. However, it can be
originated in a deeper structural problem, namely the external imbalance.
Moreover, this structural problem endangers the member states appearing to be
stable among the periphery countries in the single currency zone. 
Of course, several factors can be enlisted behind the European crisis. For exam-
ple, the expansion of indebtedness of households through the products of finan-
cial innovation, the speculative bubble in the real estate market and service sector
[Neményi & Oblath 2012], or the plenty of liquidity, the expansionary monetary
policy [Bini Smaghy, 2010]. However, it was recognized by Neményi and Oblath
Az eurózóna adósságválsága felszínre hozta az egységes piac egyik szerkezeti
problémáját. Az egységes valuta rögzített átváltási árfolyamot teremtett az
eurózóna tagállamai között. Így a kevésbé versenyképes országok nem tudják
javítani a bérversenyképességüket a leértékelésen keresztül, ellenben arra
ösztönzi őket a rendszer, hogy előrehozzák a fogyasztást, mivel az egységes
jegybanki alapkamat és az övezet stabilitása olcsóvá tette számukra az
adósságfinanszírozást. A tanulmány áttekinti az ún. fordított Balassa–
Samuelson hatás folyamatát, hogy ezen keresztül magyarázza el a külső
eladósodás jelentőségét az adósságválság esetében.
[2012: 596] that not only those countries got into trouble, who have been under
excessive deficit procedure of the Community. Baltic sudden stop in 2007 or the
Slovenian indebtedness problems in 2012 appeared in countries with sustainable
budget balance. Divergence in inflation, competitiveness and relative wage cost
was already observable among the euro zone countries.*  
In the single European market, it seems that the individual external balance of
member states became neglected aspect. In the catching-up member states with
inflation beyond the average, the single central bank rate proved to be too low in
the sense that credit was very cheap and it was preferable to spend in the current
present instead of saving for future. Meanwhile, the single currency caused unad-
justable real appreciation, since it has been working as a peg inward the single mar-
ket. This ruined wage competitiveness of these countries by increasing wage
demand because of higher inflation. The additional inflation and the increasing
wages were originated in external credit money creating additional demand. The
relatively cheap credit – which a priori originated from non-local sources –
financed mostly consumption of imported products and services. This could have
happened until any of the global financial actors were willing to seek risky emerg-
ing market items. The debt crisis situation – originated in the external indebted-
ness – reveals the trap of those periphery countries in the euro zone which wast-
ed the single currency advantages to finance the cheap import from foreign (pub-
lic and private) credit. These countries can not neither devaluate their currency to
improve the current account nor have the public debt to depreciate through infla-
tion. Even the exit from the currency union can not be easy solution for these
externally indebted countries as the debt would remain in euro, what would only
multiply their debt crisis, since sharp foreign exchange depreciation is expectable
after their exit. [Kutasi 2012:717–718]
The multi-level inflation with a single interest rate of ECB has preferred the
high-inflation countries as a counter-selection in the loan market, but for their fate,
this also has discouraged the private savings in these countries. It can be followed
in time series of effective exchange rate and unit labour cost that their has been
real appreciation in the member sates with high inflation in comparison to ones
with low inflation, in the single currency zone without any local monetary inter-
vention. This Reverse Balassa–Samuelson impact would have been motivation for
excessive intra-community import in externally indebted countries. The survey on
less and less competitive wage of countries suffering from real appreciation is an
explanation for loss of competitiveness in their export and for relative cheapness
of import.
2. THEORY OF THE EFFECT
As Alessandrini et al. [2012] explains, only fiscal union can solve the external
imbalance problem by mechanism of redistribution just like inward a country.
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* For example, the cumulated growth of ULC (unit labour cost) between 1999 and 2006 was 1,5% in
Germany, but 25,2% in Greece, 23,2% in Spain, 27,7% in Portugal. (Neményi & Oblath, 2012: table 1)
Until there is no fiscal union, the credit and bond markets will redistribute fund for
counties having external deficit, but in an uncontrolled way what result opportu-
nity for speculative attacks again euro zone states one by one. The foreign/nation-
al rate in the composition of public and private debt determines the yield, thus a
cumulative imbalance of current account results higher yield on debt. As
Komáromi [2008:15] examined through empirical data, the net financing capabili-
ty of a country depends on the current and the capital account. The higher is the
weight of demand for net financing through current account – namely the debt
generating items, – the more unfavourable is the structure of the external indebt-
edness. As Garber [1999:211] described, the fear of default and the fear of exit from
euro zone will finally result shortage of credit supply and, thus, a debt crisis.
It is worth to emphasize, that in an open economy it is very likely that savings
and investments correlate very weakly to each other, unlike in a closed economy
assumed by Keynes where savings and investments assumed to be equal. Obstfeld
and Rogoff [1996], in their 'new open economy model', emphasized the phenome-
non of free international movement of national savings, thus, the free internation-
al financing of investments, what is called Feldstein–Horioka puzzle [see Feldstein
& Horioka 1980]. According to the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle, Afonso and Rault
[2008] stated that, if savings and investments are not correlated, the budget deficit
and the current account deficit “tend to move jointly”.
As there has been neither individual devaluation nor federal bail-out mecha-
nism, the unsolved external imbalance can result divergence, regression and degra-
dation of externally indebted countries. This is the so called Reverse Balassa–
Samuelson effect. [see Grafe & Wyplosz 1997; Jakab & Kovács 2000:144]. The orig-
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Demand: demand of consumption, w in non-tr.: wage level in non-tradable sector, w in tradable:
wage level in tradable sector, X: export, CA: current account; white arrows show the causal relations,
grey arrows show change of variable ( means increase,  means decrease)
Source: author's own construction
Figure 1 Mechanism of Reverse Balassa–Samuelson effect in a national economy
inal Balassa–Samuelson effect derives the higher inflation of catching-up countries
from the development of productivity in the catching-up tradable sector which
causes wage increase and thus inflation pressure in the non-tradable sector.
[Balassa 1964] The Reverse Balassa–Samuelson effect means that the relative
change of price leads to divergence of productivity in the following way: In the
euro zone, the quick convergence of interest rate (see figure 2) imposed overheat-
ing in consumption in periphery economies of the euro zone. The expectations of
households based on sharply decreasing interest rate were unfounded, but result-
ed quick private indebtedness particularly through consumption of non-tradable
services. This latter impact raised the wage demands in the local non-tradable sec-
tor what spilled over to the tradable (export) sector. Thus, the export competitive-
ness deteriorated, meanwhile the local inflation rose by the higher wage cost.
[Mongelli & Wyplosz 2008; Neményi & Oblath 2012]
Moreover, Lane and Perotti [1998], Beetsma at al. [2008], Benetrix and Lane
[2009] found that the increasing public spending in the euro zone countries shift-
ed the demand toward the non-tradable sector what resulted increasing wages log-
ically there. Namely, the fiscal processes contributed to the emergence of Reverse
Balassa–Samuelson effect. However, Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2002] found limited
correlation between public debt and external imbalance in high developed coun-
tries.
3. SIGNS OF REVERSE BALASSA–SAMUELSON EFFECT
The outcome of the reverse B–S effect is a continuous asymmetry in intra-zone
trade. Table 1 shows permanent German surplus in trade relation with euro zone
periphery countries. 
Table 1 German trade balance with some euro zone countries, 2004–2007 and 2011
Positive value means German surplus, negative means German deficit
Source: DESTAT Statistische Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008 and 2012,
www.destat.de
If there is analysis on processes of real effective exchange rate (REER, see figure 2)
and nominal unit labour cost (ULC, see figure 3) by country, it gets clear that the
past period of euro zone between 1999 and 2011 resulted measurable relative
depreciation of German production prices and costs. The REER data series shows
in comparison to the rest of euro zone that pegged rate has been very favourable
for Germany and disadvantageous to the euro zone periphery – except Slovenia.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2011
Estonia 342 650 954 1078 1018
Greece 4677 4696 5282 5980 3130
Spain 18823 21948 21943 27015 12320
Portugal 2190 3321 3282 3692 2319
Italy 15802 17506 17878 20801 14200
Slovenia 297 472 402 573 –483
Slovakia –1840 –919 265 –486 –349
The single currency works as a fixed rate – one euro to one euro – in the inter-
member state relations. Appreciation means worsening competitiveness in trade
and inflowing FDI. 
In the trends of ULC, all examined periphery countries has been loosing their
wage competitiveness in comparison, meanwhile the German one has improved
continuously, namely got more competitive. The crisis years made change in the
process which created imbalance. The EL, ES, PT, EE and SK ULC indices has made
a turn, particularly because of decrease in nominal wages. This turn was estab-
lished, also, in case of the analysis on current account imbalance, nevertheless, the
rebalancing is far from balanced relations
4. CONCLUSIONS
This study explained the national external imbalance problem in the heteroge-
neous single currency zone. The explanation was based on the impact of pegged
foreign exchange, the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle and the Reverse Balassa–
Samuelson effect. 
The external imbalance problem was understood on the periphery economies
of the euro zone market. The problem was represented by time series of current
account, terms of trade and inflation. The explanation of euro zone imbalance was
based on NEER, REER and ULC data analysis.
The conclusion from ULC data series is that if the fiscal policy wants to help the
export competitiveness, instead of demand for non-tradable goods and services, it
should cut the taxes on wage cost, stimulate the private saving, secure the solven-
cy of domestic banks and maintain the flexibility of wages and prices.
Source: DG-ECFIN Price and Cost Competitiveness, 2012 October
Figure 2 Annual Real Effective Exchange Rates vs. rest of euro zone, HICP deflator
(2005 = 100)
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Source: DG-ECFIN Price and Cost Competitiveness, 2012 October
Figure 3 Nominal Unit Labour Cost (2005 = 100)
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